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Abstract 
We survey about 110 recently published studies on Sino-African relations; put some structure 
on the documented issues before suggesting some solutions and strategies to the identified 
policy syndromes. The documented issues classified into eight main strands include, China: 
targeting nations with abundant natural resources; focusing on countries with bad governance; 
not hiring local workers; outbidding other countries by flouting environmental and social 
standards; importing workers that do not integrate into domestic society and living in 
extremely simple conditions; exhibiting low linkages between her operations and local 
businesses; exporting low quality products to Africa; and the emergence of China hindering 
Africa’s development.  
 
JEL Classification: F19; F21; O10; O19; O55 
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1. Introduction 
 
 There is a growing  body of literature sustaining that the lost decades in Africa could 
substantially be traceable to its application of the Washington Consensus (Lin, 2015) and 
false economics of preconditions (Monga, 2014). Accordingly, policies of privatization, 
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liberalization, marketisation, complete openness, and growing reduction of government 
involvement in economic activities have not led to expected benefits in the continent (Fofack, 
2014, p. 6; Amavilah, 2014). Unappealing external trends that have led to the shifting 
tendency include, inter alia: slavery, colonialism, Bretton Wood’s structural adjustment 
policies, Cold War manipulations, neocolonialism, and corruption by companies from the 
West (Robinson, 2009).  In this light, China has tailored its foreign policy to take advantage 
of this growing frustration from African policy makers (Asongu et al., 2014).  
According to Lyman (2005), “China returns to Africa in the 21st century with not only 
a need for economic resources but with the cash to play the game dramatically and 
competitively”. China’s growing influence in the world economy, especially its increasing 
footprint on the African continent has engendered numerous debates in academic and 
decision-making circles. Indeed, the issues surrounding Sino-African relations are for the 
most part centered around China’s unconditional and non-interference foreign policy (Asche 
et al., 2008; Taylor, 2006; Besada et al., 2008; Ortmann, 2012; Biggeri et al., 2009)
1
. The 
plethora of studies have centered on, inter alia: the short-turn interests of the relationship 
(Duclos, 2011); the imperative for strategies of development to be oriented towards multi-
polarity (Tull, 2006); investment decisions based on bad governance and resource-seeking 
ambitions (De Grauwe et al., 2012; Kolstad and Wiig, 2011; Renard, 2011); hard political 
perspectives of the relationship (Taylor, 2007); pull and push motivations (Biggeriand 
Sanfilippo, 2009) and;  analyses of  the West’s growing suspicion about the relationship 
(Huliaras and Magliveras, 2008).  
                                                 
1
 China’s foreign policy has both positive and negative effects on the New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD). While it is consistent with the NEPAD’s view of African ownership and sovereignty, it also favors 
autocracy which is not in line with the NEPAD’s perspective of democracy (Asongu  et al., 2014).  
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 To the best of our knowledge, the bulk of recent literature has consisted of presenting 
and depicting the issues surrounding the Sino-African relationship
2
.  
This stream of studies has left room for solutions to the documented policy syndromes. We 
fill this gap by extending Asongu and Aminkeng (2013) to suggest solutions and strategies to 
issues in Sino-African relations. The study has assessed and debunked burgeoning myths 
surrounding Sino-African relations. Our paper extends the underlying paper in a twofold 
manner. First, we restructure the myths into policy syndromes from further perusal of the 
literature. Second, we review the available literature to suggest strategies and solutions to the 
identified policy syndromes. The two contributions are relevant to African policy makers 
because the Sino-African relationship has been substantially documented as asymmetric  
(Giovannetti and Sanfilippo,  2009, p. 506; Villoria, 2009, p. 531; Ndjio, 2009, p. 606; 
Huliaras and Magliveras, 2008;  Alden, 2016, p. 147; Brooks, 201, p. 113; Askouri, 2007, p. 
71; Kiggundu, 2008, p. 130; Elu and Price, 2010, p. 587;  Chemingui and Bchir, 2010, p. 562; 
Power, 2008, p. 7; Breslin and Taylor, 2008; Large, 2008, p. 93).   
 The proposed Sino-African policies are also drawn from a broad stream of studies on 
‘achieving development success: strategies and lessons from the developing world’ (Fosu, 
2012, 2013a) based on past historical experiences (Fosu, 2010). These include, inter alia: 
Malaysia, South Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand in  East Asia and the Pacific (Khan, 2013; 
Lee, 2013; Warr, 2013; Jomo and Wee, 2013; Thoburn, 2013); the burgeoning Asian giants of 
India and China (Singh, 2013; Santos-Paulino, 2013;  Yao, 2013; Asongu and Aminkeng, 
2013); Latin America and the Caribbean with some emphasis  on Costa Rica, Brazil, the 
                                                 
2
 The interested reader can confirm this position by referring to, inter alia: Alves (2006), Gaye (2006), Schiere 
and Walkenhorst (2010) Alden et al. (2008),  Jenkins and Edwards, (2006), Moreira (2007), Brenton and 
Walkenhorst (2010), Guerroro and Manji (2008),   Chemingui and Bchir (2010), Schiere  (2010), Sanfilippo 
(2010), Wu and Cheng (2010), Kitissou (2007),  Wei and Wang (2009), Lall et al. (2005),   Biggeri and 
Sanfilippo (2009),  Muneko and Koyi (2008),  Wang and Zheng (2010), Ji (2010), Wang and Zheng (2012), Wei 
(2007),  Duclos (2011),  Mawdsley (2008),  Zhu (2010),  De Grauwe et al. (2012), Klaplinsky and Messner 
(2008), Renard (2011), Lin and Farrell  (2013),   Drogendijk and Blomkvist (2013),   Wei (2013), Zhang et al. 
(2013),    Munemo (2013),  Diaw and Lessoua (2013),  Adekunle and Gitau (2013), Babatunde (2013) and 
Asongu and Aminkeng (2013).  
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Dominican Republic and Chile (Solimano, 2013; De Mello, 2013; Trejos, 2013; Cardoso, 
2013; Pozo et al., 2013); the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region with cases of 
Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain and, Tunisia (Drine, 2013; Looney, 2013; 
Nyarko, 2013;   Baliamoune-Lutz, 2013) and; sub-Saharan Africa with emphasis on Ghana, 
Botswana, South Africa and Mauritius (Robinson, 2013; Lundahl and Petersson, 2013; 
Subramanian, 2013; Naudé, 2013; Fosu, 2013b). 
 Therefore, in addition to solutions that are drawn from the Sino-African literature, the 
suggested policies for identified syndromes reflect a diversity of multi-polar strategies in 
development, inter alia: the diversification strategies of the UAE, Oman and Bahrain; the 
political economy of China that is based on ‘disinterested-government’; optimal strategies in 
the management of natural-resources from the UAE, Oman, Bahrain and Botswana; the social 
sector programs of development in Costa Rica and Tunisia; dynamic policies in Malaysia and 
Vietnam based on orthodox-heterodox initiatives; Indian approaches of diversity management 
based on democratic political systems and; reforms in Ghana that are based on the 
Washington Consensus.  
 The remainder of the study is organised as follows. The policy syndromes surrounding 
the Sino-African relationship are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 suggests solutions and 
strategies to the identified syndromes while Section 4 concludes.  
   
2. The policy syndromes in Sino-African relations  
 
Table 1 below synthesizes eight syndromes documented in the literature. Borrowing 
from Fosu (2013c), the term ‘policy syndrome’ is employed to elucidate circumstances that 
are unfavorable to economic prosperity. These include amongst others: ‘state controls’, 
‘suboptimal inter-temporal resource allocations’, ‘administered redistribution’ and ‘state 
breakdown’.  According to Fosu, these syndromes are responsible for the humiliating growth 
of African countries after independence. Within the framework of this paper, ‘policy 
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syndromes’ are unappealing trends surrounding Sino-African relations.  The identified policy 
syndromes include: China more willing to trade with African countries that have abundant 
natural resources (Panel A); or nations with relatively poor governance standards (Panel B); 
Chinese entrepreneurs not hiring local workers (Panel C); China surpassing other corporations 
and countries because it is flouting environmental and social standards (Panel D); compared 
to Western entrepreneurs, Chinese managers and workers live in relatively simple conditions 
(Panel E); low nexuses between Chinese projects and local businesses (Panel F); the Chinese, 
relative to Western countries, export only products of low quality to Africa (Panel G) and; 
from a broad perspective, Sino-African relations are straining Africa’s emergence by stifling  
development and living standards in the continent (Panel H). According to Collier (2007), the 
sad reality is that although globalization has powered the majority of developing countries 
towards prosperity, it is now making things harder for these latecomers.  Asian economies 
have established competitive agglomerations with low wages and economies of scale.  Hence 
Asia is attracting most of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  Collier (2007) contends that 
the bottom billion are locked into natural resource exports twice over: by the threshold effects 
of Asian export agglomerations and by Asia’s desperate need for natural resources.  
The impact of the rise of the Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) in 
Africa is dynamic and varies from country to country.    Carmody (2013) examines the rise of 
the BRICS in Africa and observes that the hegemony of the western-dominated financial 
institutions has been challenged by the rise of the BRICS, reshaping global governance and 
geopolitics, and the prospects for African development.  According to Carmody (2013, p.6) 
“the rise of the BRICS has presented African countries with an alternative range of 
“partners”; opening up policy space and reconfiguring and restructuring processes of 
globalization.”  Carmody claims that the Chinese EXIM (export-import) bank is now the 
largest provider of loans to Africa, ahead of the World Bank.  The BRICS, in contrast to the 
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Western powers, pride in a policy of “non-interfering”.  While this policy might increase the 
independence of African nations, it might also sustain and strengthen authoritarian regimes. 
Indeed we observe a shift from the “good governance” to governance that works.    
 The rise of the BRICS is resulting into the (dis)empowerment of African states, 
depending on and in relation to individual actors.  For example: 
- Empowerment through new sources of finance to resist World Bank/IMF diktas 
- Empowered relative to their populations, even as their ecological space is being further 
colonized by (new) overseas-based actors.   
 
Table 1: Synthesis of the policy syndromes   
  
Panel A:  China targets countries with abundant natural resources  
 
 
Alden (2006) 
The asymmetric character in the Sino-Africa relationship is raising a lot of concerns in 
Western nations. “Motivated by vital resources and new markets to fuel its economy, 
coupled to a commitment to multilateralism, Beijing has embarked on a comprehensive 
trade and diplomatic offensive that is challenging Western pre-eminence in the region” 
(p. 147).  
  
  
 
Kiggundu (2008) 
Investments in Africa are driven by resource-oriented ambitions for the most part.  
“Results show that largely driven by monopolistic state-owned enterprises (SOE), 
china’s outward FDI is concentrated in a few large resource-rich African countries 
characterized by high risk governance environments and poor global competitiveness” 
(p. 130).  
  
Asongu and 
Aminkeng (2013) 
 
“China targets aid to African states with abundant natural resources and bad 
governments, Chinese do not hire Africans to work on their projects” (p. 263).  
  
Panel B: China targets countries with bad governance   
 
 
Kiggundu (2008) 
Investments in China are motivated by poor governance in the recipient countries.  
“Results show that largely driven by monopolistic state-owned enterprises (SOE), 
china’s outward FDI is concentrated in a few large resource-rich African countries 
characterized by high risk governance environments and poor global competitiveness” 
(p. 130).  
  
Breslin and Taylor 
(2008) 
Violations of human rights may accompany Sino-African relations.   
 
  
 
Large (2008) 
China’s non-interference policy in the Darfur crisis in Sudan is very preoccupying. 
“Today China faces the challenge of accommodating its established policy of non-
interference with the more substantive and growing complexity of Chinese involvement 
developed over the past decade in Sudan, amidst ongoing conflict in western Darfur 
and changing politics after the North-South peace agreement of January 2005”  (p. 93 
). 
  
Asongu and 
Aminkeng (2013) 
“China targets aid to African states with abundant natural resources and bad 
governments, Chinese do not hire Africans to work on their projects” (p. 263). 
  
  
Panel C: Chinese do not hire Africans to work on their projects 
  
 There are substantial issues in labor relations in the textile industry of Zambia. “Wages 
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Brooks (2010) 
were suppressed through casualisation, working conditions worsened and strict 
discipline was imposed. Workers did not gain the modern livelihoods they anticipated 
and through labour struggles, meanings and understandings of racial differences were 
produced and anger towards the Zambian state was articulated” (p. 113).  
  
 
 
 
 
Mohan (2013) 
While much has been documented on the Chinese importing their own labor resources, 
more studies are  needed to substantiate the policy syndrome.   
“It then examines a pervasive theme in China–Africa relations, which assumes that the 
Chinese work through enclaved investments to secure the resources of low-income 
economies, though in this sense the Chinese are no different from other investors. 
Where they do differ is in their bundling of aid, trade and FDI and their use of 
imported labour, which has been termed ‘surgical colonialism’. The article does not 
dispute the existence of Chinese enclaves but argues that we need more empirical 
evidence on the levels of labour importation in relation to local labour market 
conditions”. (p. 1255). 
  
Asongu and 
Aminkeng (2013) 
 “Chinese do not hire Africans to work on their projects” (p. 263). 
  
  
Panel D: China outbids other companies by flouting social and environmental standards 
 
  
 
Askouri (2007) 
“Ali Askouri charts the high cost of China’s rising involvement in Sudan, placing 
emphasis on the lives lost and communities displaced in the Southern Sudan and 
Darfur. He explains the rapidly growing Chinese demand for oil and the involvement of 
Chinese companies in huge infrastructure projects” (p. 71) 
  
Asongu and 
Aminkeng (2013) 
 “China outbids other companies by flouting social and environmental standards” (p. 
263). 
  
  
Panel E: Chinese workers and managers live in extremely simple conditions as compared to Western 
advisors 
 
Asongu and 
Aminkeng (2013) 
 
 “Chinese workers and managers live in extremely simple conditions as compared to 
Western advisors” (p. 263). 
 
  
Mohan and Tan-
Mullins (2009) 
“Socially, the Chinese have been welcomed in Africa although integration has been 
limited” (p. 588) 
  
  
Panel F: Low linkage between Chinese and local businesses 
 
Giovannetti and 
Sanfilippo  (2009) 
“With the intensification of economic relations, in fact, China has started flooding 
African markets with its low-cost manufactures, often at the expense of local”. (p. 506) 
  
  
 
Villoria (2009) 
Agricultural exports in Southern Africa have not been affected positively by the growth 
of China. “We find little complementarity between China's agricultural import demand 
and the Southern African (SA) countries’ agricultural export supply. We also explore 
the possibility of China affecting SA agricultural exports through higher world 
agricultural prices associated with China's growing demand for food. We find that, 
although China has moderately increased agricultural prices (in an aggregated sense), 
SA exports do not seem to benefit from these price increases” (p. 531).  
  
 
Elu and Price (2010) 
“With micro-level data on manufacturing firms in five sub-Saharan African countries, 
we estimate the parameters of firm-level production functions between 1992 and 2004. 
Our parameter estimates reveal that across the firms and countries in our sample, there 
is no relationship between productivity-enhancing foreign direct investment and trade 
with China” (p. 587) 
  
  
Chemingui and Bchir 
(2010) 
“In other words, China is expected to achieve in 10 years (2010–2020) what initially 
was expected to be achieved in 20 years in case of no agreement under the Doha 
Round, where a simple linear estimation on the evolution of Chinese exports is carried 
out. Our results also show that even in the case where China will offer more market 
access for African countries, the situation will not improve much for most of them. The 
reason is that Africa is still suffering from small productive capacities and a low level 
of diversification of its economy” (p. 562). 
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Power (2008) 
The relations are harmful to SSA’s industrial growth because it challenges the 
mainstream wisdom of industrialization being a crucial development strategic 
component. “These challenges are expressed through a combination of direct impacts 
(expressed in bilateral country-to-country relations) and indirect impacts (reflected in 
competition in third country markets). In current structures, these impacts are 
predominantly harmful for SSA's industrial growth, as expressed through its recent 
experience in the exports of clothing to the US under AGOA (African Growth & 
Opportunity Act). If Washington Consensus policies prevail, these harmful impacts will 
be sustained and deepened” (p.7). 
  
Asongu and 
Aminkeng (2013) 
“low linkage levels between Chinese and local businesses” (p. 263). 
  
  
Panel G: Compared to the West, the Chinese exports only low quality products to Africa 
  
 
 
Ndjio (2009) 
Most of what comes from China to Africa is junk and cheap: from commodities to 
prostitutes.  “The main argument of this paper is that ‘Shanghai beauties’, as 
Cameroonians generally refer to Chinese migrant prostitutes, are part of the cheap and 
depreciated commodities that China is exporting to this country through its well-
organised trade networks mostly controlled by Chinese traders from overseas. As such, 
the equivocal perception of these Asian sex workers by the native population as both 
cheap bodies and junk sex only reflects the general perception of China-sourced goods 
at large” (p. 606). 
  
  
Panel H: Overall Sino-African relations are making it harder for Africa to emerge by decreasing African 
living standards and development prospects 
 
 
Elu and Price (2010) 
In the long-run, the relation would not produce higher standards of living in SSA. 
“In addition, increasing trade openness with China has no effect on the growth rate of 
total factor productivity. To the extent that total factor productivity and its growth is a 
crucial determinant of economic growth and living standards in the long run, our 
results suggest that increasing trade openness with China is not a long-run source of 
higher living standards for sub-Saharan Africa” (p. 587). 
  
Chemingui and Bchir 
(2010) 
Due to the small capacities in production and low levels of diversification in African 
economies, Africa will not much benefit from Sino-African relations.  
  
Source: Authors. SSA: Sub-Saharan Africa  
  
In light of the above synthesis in Table 1, we briefly discuss the policy syndromes in eight 
main streams.  In the first strand on natural resources, much has been documented on China 
exclusively targeting African economies with abundant resources (Kostand and Wiig, 2011). 
Alden (2006, p. 147) has established that the asymmetric nature of Sino-African relations is 
raising substantial concerns from the West, inter alia, because the nexus is based essentially 
on the availability of natural resources. This is consistent with the Askouri (2007, p. 71) on 
Chinese demand for oil and the Kiggundu (2008, p. 130) on China’s outward foreign direct 
investment (FDI) concentrating on a limited number of African countries that are rich in 
natural resources.  
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 In the second stream, China’s investments and trade in Africa are: characterized by 
economic environments with substantial governance risk (Kiggundu, 2008, p. 130); high 
human rights violations (Breslin and Taylor, 2008; Large, 2008, p. 93), especially in coalition 
with the corrupt elites (Askouri, 2007, p. 71).  The narratives of the first-two streams are   
consistent with Drogendijk and Blomkvist (2013, p.75), Gu (2009, p. 570), Zhang et al. 
(2013, p. 96), Kragelund (2009), Carmody and Owusu (2007),  Kostad and Wiig (2011), Osei 
and Mubiru (2010), Sanfilippo (2010) and Askouri (2007).  
The third stream focused on the hiring of local workers by Chinese companies is in 
line with: (i) Kamwanga and Koyi (2009) on investment in Zambia with fairly skilled Chinese 
workers and (ii) Asongu and Aminkeng (2013) on the general atmosphere in the continent. 
While Mohan and Tan-Mullins (2009) have documented this policy syndrome as part of the 
game of competition, Mohan (2013) has been consistent with the broad conclusions of 
Asongu and Aminkeng (2013) in establishing that more studies are required to prove that this 
policy syndrome is substantially significant in Sino-African relations.  
The fourth strand emphasizes that China’s competitive advantage is fuelled by its 
ability to flout environmental and social standards. This has led to substantial labour disputes 
in the textile industry of Zambia. According to the narrative, wages have been diminishing 
and the conditions of work have also worsened (Brooks, 2010, p.113). According to Askouri 
(2007), the Sudanese elite and Chinese ‘…are joining hands to uproot poor people, 
expropriate their land and appropriate their natural resources.’ (p. 71). The environmental 
concern in the relationship has also been substantially documented in the literature (Asche and 
Schüller, 2008).  
The concern about the Chinese living in relatively very simply conditions is the fifth 
policy syndrome. According to the narrative, relative to Chinese workers, Western experts 
working in Africa integrate into and spend in the domestic economy by purchasing 
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commodities. The Chinese on the contrary, for the most part import their food and other 
subsistence needs from China (Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009; Asongu and Aminkeng, 2013). 
While an advantage of this syndrome is that it makes Chinese contracts relatively less 
expensive, spending on domestic commodities for subsistence purposes may also not 
significantly raise the cost of underlying projects.  
Low inter-business nexuses or low networks between local and Chinese businesses 
constitute the sixth strand. Some accounts hold that, inter alia: trade with China is seriously 
crowding-out vulnerable industries in Africa (Giovannetti and Sanfilippo, 2009, p. 506); the 
export sector of Southern Africa’s agricultural exports not being positively impacted by the 
burgeoning prosperity of China (Villoria, 2009, p. 531); there is no nexus between trade with 
China and productivity-enhancing FDI (Elu and Price, 2010, p. 587); the relationship is very 
detrimental for African industries because they are suffering from low diversification and 
small capacities of production (Chemingui and Bchir, 2010, p. 562)  and; SSA’s industrial 
growth is being substantially negatively affected (Power, 2008, p. 7).  
The low quality of commodities supplied to Africa relative to the Western world 
constitutes the seventh stream. Indeed, with increasing economic relations, China is 
inundating African markets with manufactures of low quality which is to the detriment of 
local businesses (Giovannetti and Sanfilippo, 2009, p. 506).  Ndjio (2009, p. 606) increases 
the tone of the narrative by establishing that everything from China is perceived as relatively 
cheap and junk: from female prostitutes to commodities.   
Finally, there is a syndrome on Sino-African relations decreasing development and 
living standard from an overall perspective. This strand is supported by, amongst others: (i) 
Chemingui and Bchir (2010) on industrial development, especially in terms of mainstream 
industrial strategy (Power, 2008, p. 7) and; (ii) Elu and Price (2010) with a more radical 
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conclusion which sustains that the evolving trade openness with China will not increase living 
standards for Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in the long-term (p. 587).  
Analyzing the ripple effects of China’s economic ascendance in SSA, Zafar (2007) 
classifies SSA countries into winners, mixed and losers.  Of the winners Zafar includes the oil 
exporters and resource-rich countries, such as  Angola, Gabon, and Sudan, and base metal 
exporters, such as Mauritania (iron ore), Mozambique (aluminum), South Africa (platinum), 
and Zambia (copper) have been positively affected by the surge in international prices for oil, 
wood, and metals, due partly to increased China’s import demand.  On those with mixed 
effects, Zafar (2007) includes some ‘resource-rich but oil-importing’ countries such as 
Botswana and the Central African Republic.  The effects of China on these countries have 
been ambiguous, since the upward pressure on metal prices has been partially dampened by 
the higher oil import bill, with the impact on the smaller economies particularly strong.  The 
losers are the oil-importing countries that are also textile exporters, such as Madagascar and 
Mauritius.  They suffer from negative ‘terms of trade’ shocks resulting from the added costs 
of oil imports and the competition of China’s textile imports, which ultimately have 
consequences in terms of  job losses and shrinkage in domestic manufacturing. Due to 
increased Chinese competition in third-country markets, these countries will lose world 
market share. Moreover, countries that are coffee producers (Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and 
Uganda) and exporters of other agricultural commodities (Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, 
Tanzania, and Zimbabwe) as well as oil importers will be hurt because; agricultural prices 
have not increased over the last couple of years.  Moreover, these African countries do not 
have a strong comparative advantage in the production of any of China’s main agricultural 
imports—wheat, corn, beef, and soybeans. As a result, these countries will most likely face a 
worsening of their trade balances. 
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According to Jenkins and Edwards (2006), the ways in which Africa has been affected 
differs from country to country, with some such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan being 
important exporters, others such as Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda mainly 
importers from Asia, and Lesotho facing competition from China in export markets. 
 
3. Solutions to policy syndromes  
3.1 China targets countries with abundant natural resources 
We first briefly discuss some perspectives from the literature on the syndromes before 
presenting the contribution of this study. First, the literature has substantially documented 
that, there is not much that can be done about China’s targeting of African countries with 
abundant natural resources. Many narratives on this issue are consistent with the position that, 
natural resources are not the only motivating elements and China is not alone in her interest 
for natural resources (Tull, 2006; Asche and  Schüller, 2008; Biggeri and Sanfilippo, 2009; 
Freschi, 2010; Asongu and Aminkeng, 2013). Accordingly, like most Western countries, 
China’s foreign policy is motivated by a plethora of ideological, social, political and 
commercial factors.   
In light of the above, the position of existing literature is that there may be no solution 
to this policy syndromes because, there are no genuine Western standards which represent 
credible benchmarks for such policies, inter alia: “The paper concludes that SSA countries 
should maximise the opportunities opened to them by their resource-base by adopting a 
similarly integrated and focused response to Chinese (and other large) investors who seek to 
draw on the continent's natural resources” (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2009, p. 551) and; China-
Africa relations have also been rewarding to resource-poor countries like Mauritius 
(Ancharaz, 2009, p. 622). We discuss solutions to the policy syndromes in three main strands: 
avoidance of the Dutch disease, beneficial effects in resource-poor countries and, a more 
holistic approach in the negotiation of contracts.   
14 
 
First, given the ineluctable character of the resource-seeking dimension of Sino-
African relations, resource-rich countries should take measures to avoid falling into the trap of 
the Dutch disease that substantially leads to low competiveness in the traditional industrial 
sector due to ‘import substitution’ and strengthening of domestic currency. These negative 
impacts include among others: decline in production and negative price shocks (Collier, 
2007). Since the non-renewable character of natural resources undoubtedly implies production 
concerns in the long-term, it is important for African countries to beware of the perils of:  
over-dependence on a specific export commodity, too much reliance by an economy on the 
primary sector and resource curses. Therefore, a diversification strategy in resources 
(especially in oil-wealthy nations) would benefit concerned African countries in the long-run. 
The strategies in resource-rich countries recently documented by Fosu (2013a) are worthwhile 
here. They include, inter alia: diversification strategies of Bahrain (Looney, 2013), the United 
Arab Emirates (Nyarko, 2013) and Oman (Drine, 2013) and the optimal natural-resource 
management strategies of the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Botswana and Bahrain 
(Naudé, 2013; Robinson, 2013).  
African countries can also augment the diversification of their economies by 
strategically limiting their supply of unprocessed natural resources to China.  For instance, 
value could be added to resources by exporting refined instead of crude oil. While this would 
render the continent less reliant on the state of the Chinese economy and movements of global 
commodity prices, it could also start preparing resource-rich countries for periods of 
diminishing natural resources. The United Arab Emirates provides a good example of how to 
respond to this future uncertainty. Accordingly, it has transformed   its cities into luxurious 
touristic and attractive financial centers.  
Second, China-African relations could also be beneficial to resource-poor countries 
like Mauritius if proper policies are put in place. This is based on underlying narratives that 
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resource-rich countries are most likely to benefit from Sino-African relations, compared to 
their poor counterparts in these endowments. For instance Ancharaz (2009, p. 622) has 
demonstrated that Mauritius is a good candidate for China’s onslaught because it has no 
materially exploitable natural endowments. Hence, it is facing substantial competition from 
China in its traditional markets. According to the author, Sino-Mauritian relations can benefit 
Mauritius because when the nexus is analyzed via aid, investment and trade, ‘preference 
erosion’ and not the emergence of China is to blame for the substantial job losses in the 
clothing industry. Accordingly, this industry has been resilient since exports are beginning to 
rise again. The author concludes by stating that Chinese investments could benefit ‘non-
resource rich’ countries if they are strategically used to penetrate other African markets. In 
wood products, Kaplinsky and Morris (2006) find that SSA’s furniture manufacturers are 
moving backwards into their resources sectors, exporting raw logs, chips for paper industry, 
and sawn timber.  Most timber from SSA is used by Asian manufacturers to produce furniture 
which displaces SSA from global furniture markets. Hence, adding value through partial or 
complete transformation of wood before exportation is imperative to increase domestic 
income from the wood industry.  
Third, the grabbing of land by China could substantially benefit the local population if 
their views are taken into account in the underlying/negotiated contracts. This is the case of 
Senegal according to Buckley (2013, p. 429). Moreover, the author argues that land grabbing 
should not be seen as a linear and straightforward process between Chinese corporations and 
African governments, but as a holistic and dynamic approach of negotiation among various 
corporate players, state actors and citizens. An interesting literature has been provided by 
Osabuohien (2014) on how local institutions can be involved in foreign land acquisition 
processes, which include amongst others: education, collaboration with local communities 
and training of non-State workers. Wouterse et al. (2011) recommend that in the respect for 
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customary and land rights, those expropriated should be compensated and rehabilitated to an 
equivalent livelihood. The United Nations (2010) has also presented stakeholder tools. They 
include, among others: contract models in the investment areas, financing guides and options 
and, orientations towards best practices in water efficiency and land management. These tools 
should help investors, States and local communities in critically managing investment 
contracts. 
Geda and Meskel (2008) employ the gravity model with a panel of 13 African 
exporters of clothing and accessories for the period 1995-2005 to find out whether China and 
India are displacing the African manufacturing export from the third market. They find strong 
evidence that China has been displacing African manufacturers from third market while India 
has been complementing them in the early years of the study.  Moreover, they have 
established that in later years, the overall third market impact of China and India has been that 
of complementarity.  They have also found evidence of shifting comparative advantage from 
China and India to Africa using the flying-geese theory, with South Africa as the leading 
goose followed by Kenya.  
 
3.2 China targets countries with bad governance  
 
 Before discussing possible solutions and strategies to this issue, it is first of all 
important to completely debunk this myth by stating that China is not the only country that 
engages with governments of questionable standards. Accordingly, foreign policy by some 
Western countries is not without hypocrisy. For example, the policies of France in Africa are 
not governed by her cherished values of ‘equality, liberty and fraternity’ (Charbonneau, 
2008). Moreover, the USA’s projects with Saudi Arabia and Equatorial Guinea are motivated 
by oil and not tailored along democratic and human rights values (Fitzgerald, 2013).  
 Governance, democracy, and human rights issues that accompany China’s policy of 
non-interference are quite alarming. Whereas institutional concerns like the absence of 
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political rights may be consistent with the Beijing model in low income African countries 
(Asongu et al., 2014), as income-levels rise and a burgeoning middle class becomes 
substantially apparent, China’s foreign policy must adjust to more credible political concerns 
(Moyo, 2013). This is because in the era of globalization, higher income countries are more 
concerned with political than economic rights (Lalountas et al., 2011; Asongu, 2014a). Hence, 
it is important for China to adjust its foreign policy to the shifting need and circumstances of 
African nations over time, especially on core demands that are directly and specifically 
related to Chinese operations.  
 The supply of weapons to African governments with undemocratic standards (Jones, 
2012) is dangerous both to domestic and Chinese interests. This is essentially because the 
impacts of severe political repression and resulting political instability would be very costly to 
all the parties concerned. In this light, it is in the interest of the Chinese model to integrate this 
reality. Moreover, corruption and instability would not only hamper Sino-African relations 
but also go a long way to ranking the continent very low in terms global hierarchy/leadership 
because of dictatorial regimes and human rights issues. On appropriate development 
strategies, the Indian approach of diversity management based on democratic political 
systems should be helpful (Singh, 2013). 
 
3.3 Chinese do not hire Africans to work on their projects 
 
 We first situate the literature on this policy syndrome before discussing appropriate 
solutions and/or strategies. While Mohan and Tan-Mullins (2009) established that the 
migration of Chinese workers was part of the competitive game, Mohan (2013) has extended 
their perspective and concluded that more empirical studies are needed to prove the myths 
surrounding Sino-African relations, especially the syndrome that the Chinese are importing  
their own labour: “The article does not dispute the existence of Chinese enclaves but argues 
that we need more empirical evidence on the levels of labour importation in relation to local 
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labour market conditions” (p. 1255). In essence, emphasis needs to be placed on the notion of 
‘labour market conditions’. Accordingly, whereas Aid from China to finance infrastructure 
has been tied to the employment of Chinese inputs and labour (Ancharaz, 2009, p. 622), 
Chinese labour is relatively better skilled in relation to local labour market conditions: “For 
some the practices include bidding at very low prices, settling for low profit margins, 
sourcing cheap inputs from China, and using fairly skilled Chinese workers” (Kamwanga and 
Koyi, 2009, p. 3).  
 Consistent with the above narratives, two main policy requirements emerge: more 
training to local workers and the imposition of a thresholds of local recruits per project by 
African governments. In line with Asongu and Aminkeng (2013), domestic governments have 
the power and leverage to dictate the percentage of project-staff that should be local. These 
local project-staff policies are already being implemented in Equatorial Guinea, Angola and 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.   
 Whether the Chinese hire local workers to work on projects also depends on how 
costly it is to get local labour and the amount of time the company has been operating on the 
continent. From a broader perspective however, the effect of investment from China on 
domestic jobs is contingent on the combination of a number of factors, inter alia, FDI: (i) 
consolidates domestic market competition, (ii)  has some influence on the displacement  of 
local providers (iii) has some domination on the market and (iv) profits are repatriated 
(Todaro and Smith, 2014).  A little over two-thirds of the profits from FDI in developing 
countries were repatriated back to investor countries. These influences ultimately mitigate 
competiton (UNCTAD, 2005).  
 Since the Africa has the fastest growing population in the world and recent evidence 
suggests the resulting unemployment would only be accomondated by public investment 
unless more private investment is encouraged (Asongu, 2013a), the evolving relationship will 
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benefit the continent if China is encouraged to invest in more labour intensive sectors. This 
strategy would be enhanced by moving to business-to-business from goverment-to-
government relationships.   
Carmody (2009, 2013) contends that as labor costs rise in China, there may be scope 
to capture new investment in labor-intensive manufacturing. However, China still has a huge 
buffer of cheap labor such that other developing countries might have to wait for long. 
 
3.4 China outbids other companies by flouting social and environmental standards 
 
 This fourth policy syndrome requires labour and environmental laws that: (i) initiate 
and practically prevent local workers from being exploited and (ii) ensure environmental 
sustainability. On land acquisitions, Wouterse et al. (2011) have provided an interesting 
literature on careful examinations and monitoring needed to foster best practices that prevent 
soil depletion, growing emissions of greenhouse gases, critical loss in biodiversity and 
substantial diversion of water from human and other environmental uses. 
 It is also very important for African governments to note that post-contract changes in 
environmental and labour laws could bring about complaints for breaches of contract and 
consequently claims for compensation from  Chinese investors (UN, 2010). Hence, social and 
environmental clauses should be factored into the contract before underlying parties engage a 
project. This is also because contemporary international law is accompanied by substantial 
unpredictability, with two opposing perspectives when it comes to law. Whereas one view is 
of the position that a new law that is written for legitimate public needs is similar to 
expropriation when there is a considerable economic impact on the investment, the other 
perspective is completely opposite. While domestic governments have been increasingly 
incorporating the provisions that lay emphasis on new measures of public health, 
environmental protection and safety, such incorporations are acknowledged under 
international investment contracts as indirect expropriation. Such changes are not 
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incorporated into Sino-African development projects. Moreover, for the simple fact that it is 
not fully known whether such issues are being handled by Sino-African investment contracts, 
African governance need to consider all options very seriously when signing deals (Asongu 
and Nguena, 2014).   
 African governments may also take advantage of China’s growing sensitivity to how it 
is perceived by the international community about her respect of social and environmental 
rights (Asche and Schüller, 2008). This could enable the implementation of more sustainable 
and equitable projects. Moreover, China is ‘on a steep learning curve’ when it comes to issues 
of environmental and corporate responsibility (Asongu and Aminkeng, 2013). Hence, African 
governments could also tailor projects in a way that it enables them to benefit from China’s 
increasing ability to learn.  
Race to the bottom via tax incentives and poor environmental standards: in most cases, 
African governments have had to offer tax incentives to attract FDI. The question is, given the 
tax cuts for investors: how will the FDI compensate for the infrastructural costs the 
government is incurring is yet to be determined?  
 
3.5 Chinese workers and managers live in extremely simple conditions as compared to 
Western advisors or experts  
 
 As highlighted in Table 1 above, this syndrome presented by Mohan and Tan-Mullins 
(2009) has been confirmed in the evolving stream of literature. There are two issues here that 
merit emphasis: lack of integration as suggested by the authors and living in simple conditions 
advanced by the latter studies.  First, by leading simple lives, the Chinese are competitive 
enough to present price discounts of between 25-50 percent in the bidding for projects, 
compared to their Western counterparts. Therefore this dimension of Sino-African relations 
should also be seen as an advantage because it is tied to efficiency and living ‘within the 
limits of available means’.  
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  On integration, adequate policies need to be put in place to facilitate the integration of 
Chinese investors and workers. Given historical differences in culture, languages and 
ethnicity, integration values may not be common across countries. However, core integration 
elements that emphasis, inter alia: the sustainability and, mutually beneficial dimensions of 
the relationship, should be clearly articulated in contracts and projects.   
 
3.6 Low linkage between Chinese and local businesses 
 
 In light of evidence that the relationship is harmful to SSA’s industrial growth (Power, 
2008, p. 7), Chinese investors need to be constrained by investment policies to contribute to 
increasing linkages with local business, especially in terms of technology transfer. These are 
also part of the ‘performance requirements’ under international law. These include, inter alia: 
the purchase of local inputs, integrating an agreed part of project implementation into local 
communities or markets and, clauses in contracts that make provision for training of local 
entrepreneurs and transfer of project technology. As we shall discuss below, while evidence 
of such transfers already exist, there is need for formal and coordinated approaches to 
improve linkages between Chinese and local businesses.  
 Munemo (2013) has presented robust evidence in support of the postulation that there 
is some technology transfer by means of ‘capital goods acquisition’ from China. Hence, trade 
liberalization policies which aim to attract capital from China should be non-preferential. 
Conditions for these include, amongst others:  growth strategies based on enhanced human 
capital accumulation and greater physical capital, more trade openness, less government 
expenditure and political stability (p. 106).  Ademola et al. (2009) has presented a good menu 
of policy measures needed to increase access to the Chinese markets (p. 485). Friedman 
(2009) believes China can bring industrial development to Africa as Japan did to Southeast 
Asia in the 1960s  and 1970s  because, China is currently transforming Africa by exporting 
entrepreneurial talents and economic dynamism (p.1). This is consistent with the position of 
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Edinger (2008) that the initiated specialized economic zones (SEZs) by the Chinese are 
growing and enhancing African value chains.  
 Policies favoring the enhancing of SEZs and industrial parks would substantially 
improve linkages of Chinese activities with local businesses. While this policy 
recommendation is not a broad consensus among specialists, there is growing emphasis in the 
literature that SEZs would improve African industrialization. Moreover, placing greater 
emphasis on small and medium size enterprises (SMEs), manufactured goods, 
telecommunications and business services would have similar outcomes (Kapinski and 
Morris, 2009). African governments can also negotiate better terms by urging China and 
Chinese investors to enhance access for African commodities overseas. In countries like 
Mauritius and Zambia where SEZ are exclusively for Chinese firms, policy needs to be 
adjusted to involve domestic firms in an effort to accommodate technology transfer.  
According to Wan (2011) China is in the process of establishing six special economic 
zones (SEZs) in Africa. Where? The main role of the Jinfei zone in Mauritius, estimated at $1 
billion, will be to provide offices, hotels, apartments, recreational services, schools and 
medical facilities. Furthermore the Jinfei projects will a hub for light engineering, precision 
works, ICT, hi-tech industries and pharmaceuticals.   Mauritius thus appears to gain 
efficiency, productivity and competitiveness via technology and structural transformation 
from sugar crops, financial services and textiles and tourism to more niche and specialized 
industries (diversification of the economy).   However the benefits for Mauritius will depend 
on the extent to which the SEZ is not closed off to Mauritian businesses and workers.     
 
3.7 Compared to the West, the Chinese exports only low quality products to Africa 
 
 The Ndjio (2009, p. 606) position on cheap Chinese goods has been substantially 
documented in the literature. While cheap Chinese good are generally of low quality, some 
have argued that it is less negative when compared to second-hand commodities like clothing 
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from Western countries, which have been viewed as an abuse to African dignity. By having 
cheaper alternatives to basic needs, the purchasing power of Africans is increased, which 
could also be considered as an improvement in living standards (Muneku and Koyi, 2008; 
Kamwanga and Koyi, 2009).  
 
3.8 Overall Sino-African relations decrease African living standards and development 
 
 Whereas the burgeoning economy of China and the country’s demand for African oil 
resources has considerably stimulated economic prosperity in oil-wealthy African nations, the 
issue of income distribution represents an important concern for sustainable and equitable 
development (Goldstein et al., 2006). Accordingly, though there has been some progress 
relative to other developing countries (Fosu, 2014), issues of income distribution in oil-rich 
nations abound (Asongu, 2013bc), essentially because recent evidence suggest capital flight is 
most acute in oil rich African countries (Boyce and Ndikumana, 2008, 2011, 2012ab; Asongu, 
2014b). Hence, whereas low-cost development solutions from China are welcomed, it may 
not be sustainable if, inter alia: accruing income is unevenly distributed, technology is not 
transferred, the Dutch disease sets-in, and the elite enrich themselves exclusively.  
 Given growing Western suspicion (Huliaras and Magliveras, 2008, p. 399), we 
recommend that the Dependence theory surrounding the Sino-African nexus should first of all 
be abandoned for a critical understanding of how the relationship is benefiting Africa 
(Ajakaiye and Kaplinsky, 2009, p. 479). More emphasis should be placed on learning how 
China is transforming African by exporting entrepreneurial talents and economic dynamism 
(Friedman, 2009) in order to understand why it is a mutually beneficial historic relationship 
that is sustainable in the future (Power and Mohan, 2010, p. 462).  
 The role of critical African agencies should also be factored-into the analysis of the 
relationship. Agencies within and beyond State are constituted of African actors that are 
playing a crucial role in the direction of the relationship (Mohan and Lampert, 2010, p. 92). 
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Along these intermediary lines, policy should move beyond inter-elite bargaining and 
enclaved investments in order to appreciate the role of independent Chinese corporations in 
Africa’s political and social development (Mohan, 2013, p. 1255).   As emphasized by 
McCormick (2008), China’s aid is positively affecting African development. However 
structural and institutional characteristics which affect the magnitude of the nexus need to be 
further investigated. Moreover, how trade with China diversifies economies in the continent 
and hence, mitigates the unappealing effect of natural resource dependence on economic 
growth as documented by Diaw and Lassoua (2013, p. 189) for the CEMAC
3
 sub-region, 
merit further investigation in other regions and countries.   
 Sino-African relations offer the possibility of a development regime that reduces 
poverty (Carmody, 2009, p. 1197)  which we shall discuss to elaborate detail below in a 
paragraph focused on reconciling the Beijing Consensus and Washington Model. A broad 
stream of the literature is consistent with this narrative: China’s substantial rate of poverty 
mitigation holds very special lessons for Africa (Wu and Cheng, 2010, p. 629).  
Since more South-South cooperation (Carmody, 2009) and complementarities with 
traditional partners (Schiere, 2010, p. 615; Wissenbach, 2009) are needed for poverty 
reduction, enhanced development effectiveness and win-win situations, we propose a 
reconciliation of the Beijing model and Washington consensus for African development. This 
synthesis throws more light into  concerns surrounding the former as a development model for 
Africa, inter alia: China representing both a new model of development and new-imperialism 
(Ovadia, 2013, p. 233) and Sino-African relations offering new avenues for African 
development despite some ambivalence on the part of the Chinese (Mohan and Power, 2008).  
As shown by Asongu et al. (2014), despite some criticisms, relative to the Washington 
Consensus (WC), the Beijing Model (BM) has been seen as more convenient to 21
st
 
                                                 
3
 Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States.  
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development (Huang, 2010). This is essentially because the former has been more oriented 
towards preaching ‘marketisation, liberalization and privitization’ because of hypothetical 
government failures (Fofack, 2014, p. 6). Whereas Moyo (2013) has defined the WC as 
‘liberal democracy, private capitalism and priority in political rights’, she has also defined 
the BM as ‘deemphasized democracy, state capitalism and priority in economic rights’. The 
synthesis suggests that prioritizing economic (political) rights in the short (long)-run should 
be optimal. Hence, the WC and BM are optimal in the long-term and short-run respectively. 
The intuition behind the synthesis is based on the rationale that a sustainable middle class is 
needed to demand political rights in a genuine manner. Therefore, only when basic economic 
rights have been satisfied in the short-term by the BM would political rights be sustainably 
demanded in the long-run. The Moyo synthesis has been partially confirmed by Lalountas et 
al. (2011) and Asongu (2014b) in developing and African countries respectively. This Moyo 
conjecture is also an extension of reforms in China (Santos-Paulino, 2013; Yao, 2013) and 
Ghana (Fosu, 2013b) based on the ‘Washington-Consensus’ and the dynamic orthodox-
heterodox strategies  in Vietnam  (Thoburn, 2013) and Malaysia (Jomo and Wee, 2013) and 
other East Asian countries (Khan, 2013). 
 In order to establish whether the recent pro-poor growth in Africa relative to other 
developing countries documented by Fosu (2014) is due to China’s engagement with the 
continent, some issues hampering the comprehensive assessment merit emphasis. 
Accordingly, consistent with the underlying literature (Asche and  Schüller, 2008), two 
dimensions are needed: on the one hand, relative and absolute pro-poor definitions that are not 
clear enough and; on the other hand, a strategically economic policy definition of pro-poor by 
African nations is also less clear.  
 While China has an Africa policy, but for a few countries south of the Sahara like 
South Africa and Botswana, African countries do not have a China policy. Hence, it is 
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important for African countries to formulate a common China policy framework based on 
rational economic arguments in order to balance existing and/or potential elements of an 
asymmetric relationship. 
China’s involvement in Botswana’s economy is mainly in the construction and trade 
sectors.  While Botswana’s economy is dominated by resource production, with diamond 
production providing 40 percent of GDP, services 48.8 percent of GDP, construction 7 
percent, manufacturing 3.4 percent and agriculture 1.8 percent, Botswana has not courted 
China into the resource extraction like many African economies have (Angola, Sudan, 
Zambia).  China’s total imports from Botswana increased from $2.17 million in 2003 to 
$118.07 million in 2012 while China’s exports to Botswana increased from $22.8million in 
2003 to $181.5 million in 2012.   According to Chen (2009, p.5) “although many Chinese 
companies have showed strong interest, to date, there is no Chinese investment in the mining 
sector in Botswana.  Moreover, the government of Botswana does not encourage Chinese 
investment in retail and whole sale sectors, fearing that it may cause damage to the local 
manufacturing industry”. Chen (2009) also identifies the competitive advantage of Chinese 
infrastructure investment in Botswana in terms of: model of entry, strong Chinese government 
support, low-cost structure and low-profit strategy, hands-on management and experience and 
expertise in building infrastructure in developing countries.    
 
4. Conclusion 
 
We have surveyed about 110 recently published studies on Sino-African relations; put 
some structure on the documented issues before suggesting some solutions and strategies to 
the identified policy syndromes. The documented issues that have been classified into eight 
main strands include, China: targeting nations with abundant natural resources; focusing on 
countries with bad governance; not hiring local workers; outbidding other countries by 
flouting environmental and social standards; importing workers that do not integrate into the 
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domestic society and living in extremely simple conditions; exhibiting low linkages between 
their operations and local businesses; exporting low quality products to Africa and; not 
engaging with the continent for Africa’s emergence.  
The positioning of this line of inquiry is not motivated by a blanket perspective of 
policy syndromes in the underlying relationship. We do not wish to overlook evidence that 
China’s trade relations are having significant positive effects in many African sectors (He, 
2013). While some narratives may sustain that Africans’ view of China is not substantially 
different from the perspective they have of Western countries (Hanusch’s, 2012), economic 
policies have been mutli-polar and represent different policy syndromes for African nations. 
We have provided a general narrative; future research positioned on narrowing-down the 
perspective to country/sector specific studies would advance knowledge in this area for more 
targeted policy implications.  
 
 
 
References  
 
Adekunle, B., and Gitau, C. M. W., (2013). “Illusion or Reality: Understanding the Flow 
Between China and Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), pp. 117-126.  
 
Ademola, O. T., Bankole, A. S., and Odewuyi, A. O., (2009). “China-Africa Trade Relations: 
Insights from AERC Scoping Studies”, The European Journal of Development Research, 
21(4), pp. 485-505. 
 
Ajakaiye, O., and Kaplinsky, R., (2009). “China in Africa:  A Relationship in Transition”, 
European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 479-484.  
 
Alden, C., (2006). “China in Africa”, Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 47(3), pp. 
147-164.  
 
Alden, C., and Alves, C., (2008). “History & Identity in the Construction of China's Africa 
Policy”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 43-58.  
 
Alden, C., Large, D., and Soares de Oliveira, R., (Eds.) (2008). China returns to Africa: A 
superpower and a continent embrace. London: Hurst. 
28 
 
 
Alves, P., (2006). Engaging Asia’s Biggest Tiger: Exploring the contours of a SACU-China 
trade deal. Trade Policy Report No. 14, South African Institute of International Affairs, 
Johannesburg.  
 
Amavilah, V. H., (2014). “Sir W.  Arthur Lewis and the Africans: Overlooked Economic 
Growth Lessons”, MPRA Paper No. 57126.  
 
Ancharaz, V., (2009). “David V. Goliath: Mauritius Facing Up to China”, European Journal 
of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 622-643.   
 
Asche, H., and  Schüller, M., (2008). “China’s engagement in Africa: opportunities and risks 
for development”, Africa Department, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit 
(GTZ) GmbH. 
 
Askouri, A., (2007). China’s Investment in Sudan: Displacing Villages and Destroying 
Communities, in Manji and Marks (eds), pp. 71-86.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013a). “How Would Population Growth Affect Investment in the Future? 
Asymmetric Panel Causality Evidence for Africa”, African Development Review, 25(1), pp. 
14-29.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013b). “How do financial reforms affect inequality through financial sector 
competition? Evidence from Africa”, Economics Bulletin, 33(1), pp. 401-414.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2013c). “Investment and Inequality in Africa: which financial channels are 
good for the poor?”, African Finance Journal, 15(2), pp. 43-65.  
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014a). “Globalization (fighting) corruption and development: how are these 
phenomena linearly and nonlinearly related in wealth effects”, Journal of Economic Studies, 
41(3), pp. 346-369. 
 
Asongu, S. A., (2014b). “Fighting African Capital Flight: Empirics on Benchmarking Policy 
Harmonization”, The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 11(2), pp. 93-122.  
 
Asongu, S. A., and Aminkeng, G. A. A., (2013a). “The economic consequences of China-
Africa relations: debunking myths in the debate”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business 
Studies,  11(4), pp. 261-277.  
 
Asongu, S. A., Nwachukwu, J. C., and Aminkeng, G. A. A., (2014). “China’s Strategies in 
Economic Diplomacy: A Survey of Updated Lessons for Africa, the West and China”, African 
Governance and Development Institute Working Paper 14/036 (Revised and Resubmitted: 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies).  
 
Asongu, S. A., and Nguena, C. L., (2014). “Equitable and Sustainable Development of 
Foreign Land Acquisitions: Lessons, Policies and Implications, Handbook of Research on In-
country Determinants and Implications with Foreign Land Acquisitions, First edited by E. 
Osabuohien, 12/2014: Chapter 1: pages 1-20; IGI Global. 
 
29 
 
Babatunde, M. A., (2013). “Sino-Africa Investment Relations: The Good, The Bad and The 
Ugly”, Asia Pacific and Globalisation Review, 3(1), pp. 1-23.  
 
Baliamoune-Lutz, M., (2013). “Tunisia’s Development Experience: A Success Story?”, In 
Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. 
Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Besada, H., Wang, Y., and Whalley, J., (2008). “China‘s Growing Economic Activity in 
Africa”, Working Paper 14024, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge. 
 
Biggeri, M., and Sanfilippo, M., (2009). “Understanding China’s move into Africa: an 
empirical analysis”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies,7(1), pp. 31-54. 
 
Boyce J. K., and Ndikumana L., (2008), ‘New Estimate of Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan 
AfricanCountries: Linkages with External Borrowing and Policy Option”, PERI Working 
Paper No. 166, University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA. 
 
Boyce J. K., and  Ndikumana L. (2011), ‘Capital flight from sub-Saharan Africa: linkages 
with external borrowing and policy options’, International Review of Applied Economics, 
25(2), 149-170. 
 
Boyce J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2012a), ‘Capital Flight from Sub-Saharan African Countries: 
Updated Estimate, 1970-2010’, Political Economy Research Institute, University of 
Massachusetts. 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/fileadmin/pdf/ADP/SSAfrica_capitalflight_Oct23_2012.pdf 
(accessed: 01/08/2014). 
 
Boyce J. K., and Ndikumana L. (2012b), ‘Rich Presidents of Poor Nations: Capital Flight 
fromResource-Rich Countries in Africa’, Political Economy Research Institute, University of 
Massachusetts. 
http://concernedafricascholars.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/caploss01-ndiku-14th.pdf 
(accessed: 01/08/2014). 
 
Brenton, P., and Walkenhorst, P., (2010). “Impact of the Rise of China on Developing 
Country Trade: Evidence from North Africa”, African Development Review, 22(1), pp. 577-
586. 
 
Breslin, S., and Taylor, I., (2008). “Explaining the Rise of ‘Human Rights’ in Analyses of 
Sino-African Relations”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 59-71. 
 
Brooks, A., (2010). “Spinning and Weaving Discontent: Labour Relations and the Production 
of Meaning at Zambia-China Mulungushi Textiles”, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
36(1), pp. 113-132.  
 
Buckley, L., (2013). “Chinese Land-Based Interventions in Senegal”, Development and 
Change, 44(2), pp. 429-450.  
 
Cardoso, E., (2013). “Between Past and Future of Latin America: Lessons from Brazil, Chile, 
Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic ”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and 
Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
30 
 
 
Carmody, P., (2009). “An Asian Driven Economic Recovery in Africa? The Zambian Case”.  
World Development, 37(7), pp. 1197-1207.  
 
Carmody, P., and Owusu, F., (2007). “Chinese vs. America geoeconomic strategies in 
Africa”, Political Geography, Political Geography, 26, pp. 504-524.  
 
Charbonneau, B., (2008). “Dreams of Empire: France, Europe, and the New Interventionism 
in Africa”, Modern & Contemporary France, 16(3), pp. 279-295.  
 
Chemingui, M. A., and Bchir, M. H., (2010). “The Future of African Trade with China under 
Alternative Trade Liberalisation Schemes”, African Development Review, 22(1), pp. 562-576. 
 
De Grauwe, P., Houssa, R., and Picillo, G., (2012). “African trade dynamics: is China a 
different trading partner? ”,  Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 10(1), pp. 
15-45.  
 
De Mello, L., (2013). “Brazil’s Growth Performance: Achievements and Prospects”, In 
Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. 
Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Diaw, D., and Lessoua, A., (2013). “Natural Resources Exports, Diversification and 
Economic Growth of CEMAC countries: On the Impact of Trade with China”, African 
Development Review, 25(2), pp. 189-202. 
 
Drine, I., (2013). “‘Successful’ Development Models: Lessons from the MENA Region”, In 
Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. 
Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Drogendijk, R.,  and Blomkvist, K., (2013). “Drivers and Motives for Chinese Outward 
Foreign Direct Investment in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), pp. 75-84.  
 
Duclos, V., (2011). “The Rise of China and India in Africa: Challenges, Opportunities and 
Critical Interventions”, Review of African Political Economy, 38(129), pp. 506-507.  
 
Edinger, H., (2008). “China‘s Commercial Relationship with Africa: Evaluating Special 
Economic Zones”, presented at the Institute for West Asian and African Studies (IWAAS), 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China, 15th April 2008. 
 
Elu, J. U., and Price, G. N., (2010). “Does China Transfer Productivity Enhancing 
Technology to Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence from Manufacturing Firms”, African 
Development Review, 22(1), pp. 587-598.  
 
Fitzgerald, A., (2013). “Why won’t the West call out Saudi Arabia for persecution of 
democratic activists”, The Guardian. 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/dec/29/saudi-arabia-us-human-rights-
persecution-activists (Accessed: 01/08/2014) 
 
Fofack, H., (2014). “The Idea of Economic Development: Views from Africa”, WIDER 
Working Paper 2014/093. 
31 
 
 
Fosu, A., (2010), “Africa’s Economic Future: Learning from the Past”, CESifo Forum, Info 
Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, 11(1), pp. 62-71.  
 
Fosu, A., (2012), “Development Success: Historical Accounts from More Advanced 
Countries”, UNU-WIDER Research Paper.  
 
Fosu, A., (2013a), “Achieving development success: Strategies and lessons from the 
developing world”, UNU-WIDER Policy Brief (November).  
 
Fosu, A., (2013b). “Country Role Models for Development Success: The Ghana Case”, In 
Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. 
Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
 
Fosu, A., (2013c), “Growth of African Economies: Productivity, Policy Syndromes and the 
Importance of Institutions”, Journal of African Economies, 22(4), pp. 523-551.  
 
Fosu, A. K., (2014). “Growth, Inequality and Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa: Recent Progress 
in a Global Context”,  CSAE Working Paper Series 2014-17.  
 
Freschi, L., (2010). “China in Africa myths and realities”, AIDWATCH  
http://aidwatchers.com/2010/02/china-in-africa-myths-and-realities/ (accessed on: 
01/08/2014). 
 
Friedman, E., (2009). “How Economic Superpower China Could Transform Africa”, Journal 
of Chinese Political Science, 14(1), pp. 1-20.  
 
Gaye, A. (2006). “Chine – Afrique: Le dragon et l’autruche. Essai d’analyse de l’évolution 
contrastée des relations sino-africaines: sainte ou impie alliance du XXIème siècle? ”  
L’Harmattan, Paris. 
 
Geda, A. and A. G. Meskel (2008), ‘China and India’s Growth Surge: Is it a Curse or Blessing 
for Africa? The Case of Manufactured Exports’, African Development Review, Vol. 20, pp. 
247–272. 
 
Giovannetti, G., and Sanfilippo, M., (2009). “Do Chinese Exports Crowd-out African Goods? 
An Econometric Analysis by Country and Sector”, European Journal of Development 
Research, 21(4), pp. 506-530. 
 
Goldstein, A., Pinaud, N., Reisen, H., and Chen, X. (2006). “The rise of China and India: 
What’s in it for Africa? ”. Paris: OECD Development Centre. 
 
Gu, J., (2009). “China’s Private Enterprises in Africa and Implications for African 
Development”, European Journal of Development Research Special Issue, 24(4), pp. 570-
587. 
 
Guerroro, D. G., and Manji, F., (2008). China’s new role in Africa and the South: A search for 
a new perspective. Cape Town, Nairobi and Oxford: Fahamu and Focus on the Global South. 
 
Hanusch, M., (2012). “African Perspectives on China Africa: Modelling Popular Percep- 
32 
 
tions and Their Economic and Political Determinants,” Oxford Development Studies 40(4), 
pp. 492-516. 
 
He, Yong. (2013). “Does China's Trade Expansion Help African Development? An Empirical 
Estimation,” China Economic Review 26 (September): pp. 28-38. 
 
Huang, Y., (2010). “Debating China's Economic Growth: The Beijing Consensus or the 
Washington Consensus”, Academy of Management Perspectives, 24(2), pp. 31-47.  
 
Huliaras, A., and Magliveras, K., (2008). “In Search of a Policy: EU and US Reactions to the 
Growing Chinese Presence in Africa”, European Foreign Affairs Review, 13(3), pp. 399-420.  
 
Jenkins, R., and Edwards, C., (2006). “The economic impacts of China and India on sub-
Saharan Africa”, Journal of Asian Economics, 17, pp. 207-225.  
 
Ji, B., (2010). “China’s economic recovery and the China model”, Journal of Chinese 
Economic and Business Studies,8(3), pp. 215-226.  
 
Jomo, K. S., and Wee, C. H., (2013). “Lessons from Post-Colonial Malaysian Economic 
Development”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the 
Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Jones, O. D., (2012). “Chinese Weapons Fuel African Conflicts, Despite Sanctions”, 
http://bigthink.com/ideafeed/chinese-weapons-fuel-african-conflicts-despite-sanctions 
(Accessed: 01/08/2014).  
 
Kamwanga, J., and Koyi, G., (2009, November). “The impact of China-Africa Investment 
relations: the case of Zambia”, African Economic Research Consortium. 
http://dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/32409/1/Zambiainvestmentrelations.
pdf?1 (Accessed: 02/08/2014). 
  
Kaplinsky, R. and Morris, M. (2006). Dangling by a thread: Can SSA survive the Chinese 
scissors? Report prepared for DFID, Brighton: Institute of Development Studies. 
 
Kaplinsky, R., and Messner, D., (2008). “Introduction: The impact of the Asian drivers on the 
developing world”, World Development, 36(2), pp. 197–209. 
 
Kaplinsky, R., and Morris, M., (2009). “Chinese FDI in Sub-Saharan Africa: Engaging with 
Large Dragons”, The European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 551-569. 
 
Khan, H. A.,  (2013). “Development Strategies: Lessons from the Experiences of South 
Korea, Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and 
Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Kiggundu, M. N., (2008). “A Profile of China‘s Outward Foreign Direct Investment to 
Africa”, Proceedings of the American Society of Business and Behavioral Sciences, 15, (1), 
pp. 130-144. 
 
Kitissou, M. (Ed.) (2007). Africa in China’s global strategy. London: Adonis and Abbey. 
 
33 
 
Kolstad, I., and Wiig, A., (2011). “Better the Devil You Know? Chinese Foreign Direct 
Investment in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 12(2), 31-50. 
 
Kragelund, P., (2009). “Part of the Disease Or Part of the Cure?” Chinese Investments in the 
Zambian Mining and Construction Sectors”, European Journal of Development Research, 
21(4), pp. 644-661. 
 
Kuo, S. C. Y., (2012). “Beijing's Understanding of African Security: Context and 
Limitations”, African Security, 5(1), pp. 24-43.  
 
Lall, S., Weiss, J., and Oikawa, H., (2005). “China’s Competitive Threat to Latin America: 
An Analysis for 1990-2002”, Oxford Development Studies, 33(2), pp. 163-194.  
 
Lalountas, D.A., Manolas, G.A., and Vavouras, I.S., (2011), “Corruption, globalization and 
development: How are these three phenomena related?”, Journal of Policy Modeling, 33, 
pp.636-648. 
 
Large, D., (2008). “China & the Contradictions of ‘Non-interference’ in Sudan”, Review of 
African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 93-106. 
 
Lee, K., (2013), “How can Korea be a Role Model for Catch-up Development? A ‘Capability-
based’ View”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the 
Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Lin, J. Y., (2015). “The Washington Consensus Revisited A New Structural Economics 
Perspective”, Journal of Economic Policy Reform: Forthcoming. 
 
Lin, X., and Farrell, C., (2013). “The Internationalization Strategies of Chinese State and 
Private State Enterprises in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), pp.  85-95.  
 
Looney, R. E., (2013). “The Omani and the Bahraini Paths to Development: Rare and 
Contrasting Oil-Based Economic Success Stories”, In Achieving Development Success: 
Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Lundahl, M., and Petersson. L., (2013). “Post Apartheid South Africa: An Economic Story?”, 
In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. 
Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
 
Lyman, Princeton N. (2005, 21 July). “China’s Rising Role in Africa”, Council on  Foreign 
Relations, http://www.cfr.org/china/chinas-rising-role-africa/p8436 (Accessed: 02/01/2014). 
 
Mawdsley, E. (2008). “Fu Manchu versus Dr Livingstone in the Dark Continent? How British 
broadsheet newspapers represent China, Africa and the West”, Political Geography, 27, pp. 
509-529. 
 
McCormick, D., (2008). “China & India as Africa's New Donors: The Impact of Aid on 
Development”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 73-92. 
 
Menell, N., (2010). “China and Africa: The New Neocolonialism?” Helen Suzman 
Foundation.  
34 
 
 
Mohan, G., (2013). “Beyond the Enclave: Towards a Critical Political Economy of China and 
Africa”, Development and Change, 44(6), pp. 1255–1272.  
 
Mohan, G., and Lampert, B., (2010). “Negotiating China: Reinserting African agency into 
China-Africa relations”, African Affairs, 112(446), pp. 92-110.  
 
Mohan, G., and Tan-Mullins, M., (2009). “Chinese Migrants in Africa as New Agents of 
Development? An Analytical Framework”, European Journal of Development Research, 
21(4), pp. 588-605. 
 
Mohan, G., and Power, M., (2008). “New African Choices? The Politics of Chinese 
Engagement”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 23-42.  
 
Monga, C., (2014). “The False Economics of Pre-Conditions: Policymaking in the African 
Context”, Journal of African Development, 16(2), pp. 121-140. 
 
Moreira, M., M., (2007). “Fear of China: Is There a Future for Manufacturing in Latin 
America?”, World Development, 35(3), pp. 355-376.  
 
Moyo, D., (2013). “Is China a new idol for developing countries”, TED Talks, New Ideas 
Every day, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Q2aznfmcYU (Accessed: 07/05/2014).  
 
Muneku, A., and Koyi, G., (2008). “The Social Economic Impact of Asian FDI in Zambia”, 
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Lusaka. 
 
Munemo, J., (2013). “Examining Imports of Capital Goods From China as a Channel for 
Technology Transfer and Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), 
pp. 106-116.  
 
Naudé, W., (2013). “Development Progress in Sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Botswana, 
Ghana, Mauritius and South Africa”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and 
Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
 
Ndjio, B., (2009). “ ‘Shanghai Beauties’ and African Desires: Migration, Trade and Chinese 
Prostitution in Cameroon”, European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 606-621.  
 
Nyarko, Y., (2013). “The United Arab Emirates: Some Lessons in Economic Development”, 
In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. 
Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Ortmann, S., (2012). “The ‘Beijing consensus’ and the ‘Singapore model’: unmasking the 
myth of an alternative authoritarian state-capitalist model”, Journal of Chinese Economic and 
Business Studies, 10(4), pp. 337-359. 
 
 Osabuohien, E. S., (2014). “Land-scale agricultural land investments and local institutions in 
 Africa”, Land Use Policy, 39, pp.155-165. 
Osei, B., and Mubiru, A. M., (2010, July). “Chinese Trade and Investment Activities in 
Africa”, African Development Bank’s Policy Brief, 1 (4), pp. 1-12.  
 
35 
 
Ovadia, J. S., (2013). “Accumulation with or without dispossession? A ‘both/and’ approach to 
China in Africa with reference to Angola”, Review of African Political Economy, 40(136), pp. 
233-250.  
 
Power, R., (2008). “What Does the Rise of China Do for Industrialisation in Sub-Saharan 
Africa?”, Review of African Political Economy, 35(115), pp. 7-22. 
 
Power, M., and Mohan, G., (2010). “Towards a Critical Geopolitics of China's Engagement 
with African Development”, Geopolitics and Development, 15(3), pp. 462-495.  
 
Pozo, S., Sanchez-Fung, J., and Santos-Paulino, A. U.,  (2013). “Economic Development 
Strategies in the Dominican Republic”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and 
Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
 
Renard, M. F., (2011, May), “China’s trade and FDI in Africa”, African Development Bank 
Working Paper No. 126.  
 
Robinson, D. A., (2009). “Hearts, Minds and Wallets: Lessons from China’s Growing 
Relationship with Africa”, Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences, 1(3), 
pp. 861-869. 
 
Robinson, J., (2013). “Botswana as a Role Model for Country Success”, In Achieving 
Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Sanfilippo, M., (2010). “Chinese FDI to Africa: What Is the Nexus with Foreign Economic 
Cooperation?”, African Development Review, 22(1), pp. 599-614.  
 
Santos-Paulino, A. U.,  (2013). “Country Role Model of Development Success: Lessons from 
China and India ”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the 
Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
 
Schiere, R., (2010). “Building Complementarities in African between Different Development 
Cooperation Modalities of Traditional Development Partners and China”, African 
Development Review, 22(1), pp. 615-628. 
 
Schiere, R., and Walkenhorst, P., (2010). “Introduction: China’s Increasing Engagement in 
Africa: Towards Stronger Trade, Investment and Development Cooperation”, African 
Development Review, 22(1), pp. 559-561.  
 
Singh, N.,  (2013). “Democracy, Diversity and Development: India’s Strategy and 
Outcomes”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing 
World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press.  
 
Solimano, A., (2013). “Three Decades of Neoliberal Economics in Chile: Achievements, 
Failures and Dilemmas”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the 
Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
 
36 
 
Subramanian, A., (2013). “The Mauritian Success Story and Its Lessons”, In Achieving 
Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Taylor, I., (2006). “China’s oil diplomacy in Africa”, International Affairs, 82(5), pp. 937-
959.  
 
Taylor, I., (2007). “Governance in Africa and Sino-Africa Relations: Contradictions or 
Confluence?”, Politics, 27(3), pp. 139-146. 
 
Thoburn, J.,  (2013). “Vietnam as a Role Model for Development”, In Achieving Development 
Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University 
Press.  
 
Todaro, S.,and Smith, S.,  (2014). Economic Development, 12
th
 Edition.  
 
Trejos, A., (2013). “Country Role Models for Development Success: The Case of  Costa 
Rica”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing 
World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
 
Tull, D. M., (2006). “China’s engagement in Africa: scope, significance and consequences”, 
The Journal of Modern African Studies, 44(3), pp. 459-479. 
 
United Nations (2010, January). “Foreign land purchases for agriculture: what impact on 
sustainable development?”, Sustainable Development and Innovation Briefs  Issue  No. 8.  
 
UNCTAD (2005). Economic Development in Africa. Rethinking the Role of Foreign Direct 
Investment, Geneva. 
 
Villoria, N., (2009). “China's Growth and the Agricultural Exports of Sub-Saharan Southern 
Africa”, European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 531-550. 
 
Wan, J. (2011). “Who Benefits from Chinese Investments in Mauritius?”, Think Africa Press, 
http://thinkafricapress.com/mauritius/sez-jinfei-china-problems-hasty-investment  
 
Wang, L., and Zheng, J., (2010). “China and the changing landscape of the world economy”, 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 8(3), pp. 203-214.  
 
Wang, L., and Zheng, J., (2012). “China’s rise as a new paradigm in the world economy: 
preliminaries”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 10(4), pp. 301-312. 
 
Warr, P., (2013). “Thailand’s Development Strategy and Growth Performance”, In Achieving 
Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Wei, W. X., (2013). “Special Issue: Chinese Trade and Investment in Africa”, Journal of 
African Business, 14(2), pp. 72-74.  
 
Wei, P., (2007, October). “The Chinese Model of Development”, Center for Chinese and 
Global Affairs, Peking University.  
37 
 
 
Wei, Y., and Wang, C., (2009), “Understanding China’s international economic integration”, 
Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies,7(4), pp. 401-408. 
 
Wissenbach, U., (2009). “The EU’s Response to China’s Africa Safari: Can Triangular Co-
operation Match Needs?”, European Journal of Development Research, 21(4), pp. 21(4), pp. 
662-674.  
 
Wouterse, F., Deininger, K., Selod, H., Badiane, O., Swinnen, J., Von Braun, J., and 
 Zilberman, D., (2011). “Foreign Direct Investment in Land in West Africa: The Status Quo, 
 Lessonsfrom Other Regions, Implications for Research”, West & Central Africa Office  
Thematic Research Note 1.  
 
Wu, Z., and Cheng, E., (2010). “Poverty Alleviation in the People’s Republic of China: The 
Implications for Sino-African Cooperation in Poverty Reduction”, African Development 
Review, 22(1), pp. 629-643.  
 
Yao, Y. E.,  (2013). “The Disinterested Government: An Interpretation of China’s Economic 
Success in the Reform Era ”, In Achieving Development Success: Strategies and Lessons from 
the Developing World, ed. Fosu, A., Oxford University Press. 
 
Zafar, A. (2007). “The growing relationship between China and sub-Saharan Africa: 
Macroeconomic, trade, investment and aid links”, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 
22, no. 1, pp. 103–130. 
 
Zhang J., Wei, W. X., and Liu, Z., (2013), “Strategic Entry and Determinants of Chinese 
Private Sector Enterprises in Africa”, Journal of African Business, 14(2), pp. 96-105.  
 
Zhu, Y., (2010). “Trade, capital flows and external balance: is China unique in two hundred 
years of globalization?”, Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies,8(1), pp. 1-22.  
